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Title: The Illusion of Purity 
Subtitle: Chantal Mouffe’s Realist Critique of Cosmopolitanism 
Abstract: 
Over the last twenty years, cosmopolitan theories have been benefiting greatly from the 
dialogue between defenders and critics of world citizenship. Yet, the decidedly polemic 
aspect of this debate, while allowing for intellectual progress, is also responsible for 
overdrawn generalizations. Instead of entering into the debate directly, this paper 
attempts to refute a specific anti-cosmopolitan claim raised by Chantal Mouffe. Her 
realist objection to cosmopolitanism, derived from the conceptual framework of agonistic 
pluralism, is mistaken at a crucial point: a firm dichotomy between politics and morality 
cannot provide an alternative to theories of world citizenship, because Mouffe’s embrace 
of multipolarity as a principle of global politics must equally appeal to a set of universal 
norms governing international relations. This paper argues that even the realist model of 
multipolarity needs to conceive of a minimal morality to create the symbolic ground on 
which various power centres can be held accountable. 
Keywords: agonistic democracy, Chantal Mouffe, cosmopolitanism, multipolarity, 
terrorism; 
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I. Resisting World Citizenship1 
The steep career of cosmopolitan theories during the past 20 years can, to a certain extent, 
be explained by the ongoing, intensive dialogue between defenders and critics of various 
types of world citizenship.2 While external and internal objections against ‘extreme’ 
forms of abstract universalism have changed the contours of the debate about moral 
cosmopolitanism3, the debate about political cosmopolitanism appears to be stuck in a 
dead-end, notwithstanding the massive amount of publications in the field. Even though 
the focus in much of the recent literature has noticeably shifted from individual 
obligations toward distant others to democratic participation and civil institutions, there 
remain major areas of discord with those who straightforwardly reject the core values of 
cosmopolitanism.4 
This paper is intended as an effort in book-keeping, in weighing communicative 
gains against communicative losses: The decidedly polemic aspect of the – mostly 
academic – argument between defenders and critics of cosmopolitanism is not only 
positive as it keeps the discussion going and pushes it forward; it is also responsible for 
overdrawn generalizations and artificial oppositions.5 Uncovering these strategies of 
simplification by no means settles the argument. However, it might help to see where the 
debate between defenders and critics of world citizenship is unproductive. Once we are 
aware of these strategies of simplification, we might be better prepared to focus on those 
positions that are actually controversial and avoid setting up and attacking straw-men. 
Most objections raised against cosmopolitanism, be they of the postcolonial, anti-
globalization or realist variety, share a deep discontent with formal appeals to 
universals.6 Their conceptions of the political are, on different grounds and with different 
3 
consequences, based on notions of disagreement, conflict and struggle, rather than on 
ideas of consensus, concord and unanimity.7 Anti-cosmopolitans usually believe that 
invoking a universal subject like ‘the family of mankind’ effectively conceals the 
presence of power – the racist West, globalized capitalism, the American empire – behind 
the discourse. It is a common goal of postcolonial, anti-globalization and realist positions 
to tear away this facade, expose the speaking and acting subject, and reveal that all formal 
appeals to universal subjects are in fact full of particular content. 
In doing so, each critique employs a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’8 that seeks to 
reconstruct the traces of power behind allegedly neutral references to world citizenship. 
Hence, it is vital for the critics of cosmopolitanism to detect evidence for their charge of 
the manipulative use of universals: if they managed to conclusively show that specific 
interests drive the actors who make use of universals, then it could be argued that 
cosmopolitan approaches are fundamentally flawed in their claim against certain 
localized actors, such as states within a Westphalian system of equal sovereignty. 
Instead of entering into this debate directly, by adopting a constructive stance pro or 
con cosmopolitanism, I will take a detour and look at the logic of a specific anti-
cosmopolitan argument. I will try to illustrate how the realist strand of criticism 
conceives of the moralizing effects of cosmopolitanism. My ambition is twofold: (1) to 
analyze the assumptions on which the hermeneutics of suspicion rests and (2) to speculate 
about the immanent shortcomings of such a project. I will argue that the realist objection 
to cosmopolitanism is mistaken at a crucial point: a firm dichotomy between politics and 
morality cannot provide an alternative to theories of world citizenship. My paper shall 
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thus contribute to an indirect defence of a minimal morality governing international 
relations.9 
The realist position I am interested in maintains that moral arguments are not only 
out of place in a model of global politics, they are even harmful, because they undermine 
the equal sovereignty of ‘poles’ of power and exacerbate the legitimation crisis of 
existing legal mechanisms enshrined in the UN Charter.10 Contrary to the view that 
consensus is morally desirable as long as it is the product of rational deliberation among 
free and equal people, some sceptics submit that morality is not a means to create lasting 
harmony, but rather a source of harsh controversy.11 The ongoing ‘war on terror’ fuels the 
dissatisfaction of these sceptics, because the American empire frequently makes use of 
moral and religious terms to denigrate its political opponents. 
Therefore, it is essential for the realist position to remain absolutely unaffected by 
any appeal to morality, lest it becomes internally inconsistent. Moral considerations only 
serve the purpose of self-elevation: the moral rightness of political group A is always 
founded on the moral wrongness of political group B. This strict anti-moralism leads the 
realists from a point about the priority of politics to a claim about the purity of politics. 
The creation of pure politics, untainted by any moral considerations, is one of the guiding 
motives of this version of realism.12 I will argue that shifting the emphasis from the 
priority of politics to the purity of politics is ultimately self-defeating. While we might 
support the idea that politics is prior to morality, it is hardly defendable to conceive of 
political action in international relations as something that is completely devoid of any 
moral considerations. 
5 
My interlocutor in this paper will be Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe’s rejection of 
moralization as well as her appraisal of multipolarity offer excellent examples of the 
realist critique of cosmopolitanism. In exposing what I take to be a performative 
contradiction13 at the heart of Mouffe’s model, I shall assert that resistance to world 
citizenship cannot be anchored in a firm dichotomy between politics and morality – 
which is not to say that opposition to an argumentative and political project of world 
citizenship is altogether implausible. 
II. Mouffe’s Conception of Agonistic Democracy and Pluralism 
In her newest book, Chantal Mouffe attempts, among other things, to apply her domestic 
conception of agonistic democracy and pluralism to the realm of international relations.14 
To understand her plea for a multipolar world order, we have to begin by reconstructing 
the underlying rationale. 
Mouffe’s idea of agonism is derived from a critique of deliberative versions of 
democracy.15 Since ‘deliberative’ is broadly construed, it embraces a wide range of 
thinkers such as John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib. What is 
characteristic of their positions, albeit with more or less subtle variations in detail, is an 
overarching way of thinking about differences, frequently equated with liberalism as 
such. Mouffe designs her own alternative against this foil of deliberative 
accommodations of difference. 
Let us briefly consider Rawls’ answer to what he took to be the key challenge for 
present-day liberalism: the fact of reasonable pluralism.16 In his later work, Rawls was 
engaged in a defence of justice from a political standpoint, which entailed a re-tuning of 
his moral pitch in ‘A Theory of Justice.’17 In ‘Political Liberalism’18, Rawls grappled with 
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the following problem: If we accept that the basic structure of liberal societies must be 
open to pluralism in the sense that even contradictory conceptions of the good can find a 
place within it, we might be tempted to see justice as fairness – the first virtue of 
institutions – as just another ‘comprehensive doctrine.’ As a consequence, the basic 
principle of political liberalism would be drawn into rivalry with competing conceptions 
of the good, religious or otherwise, which might undermine the open foundation of liberal 
societies. 
Rawls did not want reasonable pluralism to turn against itself. By introducing the 
notion of an ‘overlapping consensus,’ which all holders of comprehensive doctrines could 
subscribe to, he tried to set up an institutional framework which guaranteed two 
conditions: (a) the protection of reasonable pluralism and (b) the overridingness of justice 
as fairness. For it is exactly with regard to such an overlapping consensus that the 
exceptional status and advantageous stability of political liberalism comes to the fore. 
Political liberalism provides free and equal citizens with the opportunity to carry out their 
controversies without undermining the basic structure itself. 
For Mouffe the approach of ‘Political Liberalism’ is part of the problem, not part of 
the solution. She contends that Rawls’ reformulation of justice, while being more 
responsive to the real world of disagreement, conflict and struggle, still falls short of 
acknowledging what the political is all about. This assessment is not surprising if we look 
at Mouffe’s distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’19: 
By ‘the political’ I refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human 
relations, antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of 
social relations. ‘Politics’, on the other side, indicates the ensemble of practices, 
discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organize 
human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual because 
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they are affected by the dimension of ‘the political’. I consider that it is only when 
we acknowledge the dimension of ‘the political’ and understand that ‘politics’ 
consists in domesticating hostility and in trying to defuse the potential antagonism 
that exists in human relations, that we can pose what I take to be the central 
question of democratic politics. […] The novelty of democratic politics is not the 
overcoming of the us/them opposition – which is an impossibility – but the 
different way in which it is established.20 
Mouffe accuses deliberative theorists of cherishing a dangerous illusion when they 
insinuate that it would be feasible, and indeed desirable, to overcome the primary feature 
of the political: the us/them-opposition. Deliberative theorists display a desire for 
cancelling out this inherent antagonism through the establishment of a sphere of 
uncontested neutrality, just like Rawls’ ‘overlapping consensus.’ The liberal 
accommodation of difference is based on a disavowal of the political, because it denies 
the inescapability of exclusionary practices. Therefore, democratic theory needs to think 
differently about differences. 
What Mouffe finds deeply troubling in the liberal tradition is the centrality 
attributed to consensus. To suggest that consensus can be fully inclusive and totally 
rational is not only empirically questionable, but also conceptually flawed, because there 
always has to be a constitutive outside from which the inside is categorically separated. In 
other words, there can be no inclusion without exclusion. This argument is directed 
against the very idea of universalism, and we will later see how the heavy weight of this 
thought bears upon other elements of Mouffe’s theory. 
The Transcendental Quality of Antagonism 
Mouffe deliberately makes a strong foundational claim by conceiving of antagonism as 
the condition of possibility for politics. The we/they-opposition possesses a 
transcendental quality in politics – it can under no circumstances be surmounted. Without 
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antagonism there simply would be no politics. Although we cannot leave the space 
constituted by the opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ we can try to reshape it according 
to the requirements of democracy. This process of transforming antagonism is absolutely 
essential, because Mouffe does not endorse the outbreak of violence that always remains 
present in the antagonistic dimension of politics. Although it is impossible, due to the 
transcendental quality of antagonism, to rule out violence in political relations, Mouffe 
wants to prevent the articulation of differences from taking a violent form. This is the 
moment for a metamorphosis: 
Antagonism is struggle between enemies, while agonism is struggle between 
adversaries. We can therefore reformulate our problem by saying that envisaged 
from the perspective of ‘agonistic pluralism’ the aim of democratic politics is to 
transform antagonism into agonism.21 
What separates democratic from non-democratic polities is not the fact that 
consensual agreement through rational deliberation takes the place of conflict and 
disagreement. If antagonism represents the condition of possibility for politics, then it 
would be fallacious to assume the differentia specifica between a democratic and a non-
democratic polity were to be isolated in the overcoming of exclusion. A democratic polity 
shares with all other forms of polities the feature of being exclusionary, but it 
distinguishes itself in that it is essentially concerned with a re-articulation of the we/they-
opposition so that enmity becomes negotiable. 
An agonistic political relationship depends on the recognition of the terms of 
legitimate contestation. This is the crucial distinction between antagonism and agonism. 
Whereas antagonism describes the potentially violent aspect of the political, agonism 
aims at containing the emergence of violence. The transformation of antagonism into 
agonism gives rise to the figure of the adversary. This figure is pivotal to agonistic 
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pluralism since it navigates between the Scylla of liberal consensus and the Charybdis of 
violent enmity. 
At one point, Mouffe calls for the democratic enterprise of sublimating 
antagonism.22 This psychoanalytical metaphor is employed to underscore the 
irrevocability of exclusionary practices: we might never be able to surmount them, yet 
there are mechanisms to work them out. The major deficit of deliberative theories is their 
false confidence in a realm beyond conflict and disagreement. To use another allegorical 
phrase from the vocabulary of psychoanalysis: their disavowal of the political cannot but 
lead to a forceful return of the repressed. It is precisely because deliberative theories do 
not account for profound differences – the antagonistic dimension of the political – that 
conflicts within societies governed by the search for consensual agreement through 
rational deliberation will be extremely difficult to contain. If dissent cannot be articulated 
through suitable channels, it will find its way out by assaulting the democratic system 
itself. Mouffe’s favourite example of the outbreak of violence as an unintended upshot of 
consensus-oriented societies is the success of radical right wing parties all over Europe.23 
Mouffe’s conception of agonistic pluralism wants to offer an alternative which 
preserves the irreconcilability of adversarial identities without provoking open hostility. 
The taming of antagonism has as its precondition the demarcation of a symbolic ground – 
the Greek word ‘agon’24 is quite adequate here – on which legitimate contestation among 
members of the same political association is achievable. By introducing a measure to 
hold legitimate from illegitimate forms of contestation apart Mouffe emphasizes that 
every adversarial identity must minimally comply with the symbolic ground of a 
democratic polity. Here, the dialectics of inclusion and exclusion constitute the political 
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space. Without the exclusion of a certain class of illicit contenders, there would be no 
chance to include another class of proper contenders. The stability of a democratic polity 
depends on an act of limitation: If every political space needs limits, then non-members 
have no right to challenge it. Non-members are on the other side of the we/they-
opposition. 
Moralization and the Neutralizing Tendency of Liberalism 
An important conclusion to be drawn from this is that Mouffe charges liberal theory with 
moralizing politics. Hypothetical devices like the ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls) or the ‘ideal 
speech situation’ (Habermas) serve the purpose of simulating circumstances under which 
just societal arrangements can ideally be discovered; they conceptualize morality as an 
independent arena in which political disputes can be settled after all. Against this view, 
Mouffe maintains that morality is not able to perform the function of settling political 
disputes. Since morality is only of instrumental use to politics, introducing moral 
considerations in political disputes will be motivated by a tactical move to occupy the 
moral high ground. Thus, moralization is conducive to the implementation of political 
interests, and its complementary effect is depoliticization: 
There is, in my view, a direct link between the weakening of the political frontier 
characteristic of the adversarial model and the ‘moralization’ of politics. By using 
the term ‘moralization’ in this context I do not mean, of course, that now people 
act in the field of politics in search of the common good, according to motives that 
would be more disinterested or impartial. What I want to indicate is that, instead 
of being constructed in political terms, the ‘we’-‘they’ opposition constitutive of 
politics is now constructed according to moral categories of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’. 
What this change of vocabulary reveals is not, as some would have it, that politics 
has been replaced by morality but that politics is being played out in the moral 
register. It is in that sense that I am proposing to understand the ‘moralization’ of 
politics – to indicate not that politics has become more moral but that nowadays 
political antagonisms are being formulated in terms of moral categories.25 
11 
In this passage Mouffe succinctly expresses her view of the relationship between 
politics and morality. The fundamental structure is again laid down by antagonism. The 
relationship between politics and morality can be shaped in a positive or a negative 
manner: either by sublimating or by moralizing antagonism. We have already seen why 
Mouffe approves of sublimation. Moralizing, on the other hand, is dangerous, because it 
creates the false impression that we are able to leave antagonism behind. It follows from 
the transcendental quality of antagonism that such a moralizing strategy is necessarily 
treacherous. For Mouffe, it is conceptually impossible to replace political antagonisms 
with moral categories, and everyone who claims otherwise actually pursues a partisan 
agenda in which his or her political interests are only ‘played out in the moral register,’ 
but are not eliminated. 
Moralization serves both the implementation and the concealment of political 
interests. To put it more precisely: it serves the implementation of political interests by 
concealing them. This complementary effect is called depoliticization. Depoliticization is 
in itself part of a political struggle if a specific programme is cloaked in purely moral 
terms. As a consequence, Mouffe’s critique of moralization employs a hermeneutics of 
suspicion to retranslate the moral terms back into political interests. While the 
moralization of politics leads to de-politicized relations between contenders, the critique 
of moralization must attempt to illuminate the deceitful appearance and show precisely 
which political interests are hidden behind which moral claims. In line with her most 
important source of inspiration, Carl Schmitt, Mouffe believes that liberal ideology 
promotes a ‘neutralization’ of the political.26 Inverting this neutralizing tendency is the 
main purpose of agonistic pluralism. 
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III. Transposing Agonism: Multipolarity 
Mouffe’s reading of the moralizing strand in liberal theory is not only relevant for 
domestic but also for international and global politics. Consider the notorious slogan of 
‘the axis of evil.’27 You do not have to be a radical anti-American to reckon that such a 
labelling serves a specific purpose: prevailing in a military fight. Designating the political 
enemy as evil facilitates a claim of authority for one’s own intentions and deeds.28 
Political group A articulates its interests in moral terms simply to gain a strategic 
advantage over group B. (In fact, most of the time both groups reserve goodness for their 
own cause, respectively.) 
Self-empowerment through moral legitimation is a widespread technique of 
warfare. Once we have identified the fault lines of the political antagonism, this self-
empowerment is easy to uncover, since we can retranslate the moral categories back into 
political interests. But what if we cannot see these fault lines, because the political space 
appears seamless, free of ruptures or fissures? That is precisely the case with 
cosmopolitanism where appeals to universal norms address every human being equally. 
How can the case thus be made that the idea of world citizenship is moralizing? Against 
various schools of cosmopolitan thought Mouffe maintains: 
[T]he central problem with the diverse forms of cosmopolitanism is that they all 
postulate, albeit in different guises, the availability of a form of consensual 
governance transcending the political, conflict and negativity. […] To believe in 
the possibility of a cosmopolitan democracy with cosmopolitan citizens with the 
same rights and obligations, a constituency that would coincide with ‘humanity’ is 
a dangerous illusion. If such a project was ever realized, it could only signify the 
world hegemony of a dominant power that would have been able to impose its 
conception of the world on the entire planet and which, identifying its interests 
with those of humanity, would treat any disagreement as an illegitimate challenge 
to its ‘rational’ leadership.29 
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It follows directly from Mouffe’s foundational claim about the transcendental 
quality of antagonism that any appeal to a realm beyond hegemony and power – an 
appeal implicit, for example, in Martha Nussbaum’s plea for world citizenship inspired 
by ancient Stoicism30 – falls prey to the hermeneutics of suspicion. A global subject like 
‘humanity’ cannot represent the real interests of all human beings equally. Universal 
norms are not fully inclusive, because they still have to be defined against something that 
is not part of the all-encompassing family of mankind. Given that a justification of 
cosmopolitanism would rather not rest on the fantastic vision of an interplanetary 
opposition between ‘us’ earthlings and ‘them’ aliens, the conclusion must be drawn that 
any consensus on a global level can only be the result of a one-sided usurpation. 
Subsequently, the unavoidable discrimination between inside and outside will be 
exercised from within humanity; but now in a way that will amount to excluding the 
political enemy from the family of mankind. Cosmopolitanism might, in Mouffe’s view, 
paradoxically generate opportunities for dehumanization.31 As a consequence, theories of 
world citizenship are deemed even more perilous than straightforward justifications of 
imperialism, because the former disguise their hegemonic aspirations while the latter 
embrace them openly. 
The current waves of terrorism and counter-terrorism can, in Mouffe’s view, be 
explained by the absence of suitable channels through which dissent from the mainstream 
of the Western way of life may be articulated non-violently.32 These channels would be 
opened up in a world of diverse power centres. For Mouffe it is beyond any doubt that the 
American empire has narrowed the political perspectives to the extent that the world 
today is dominated by a single power centre. Cosmopolitan theories are not helpful in 
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altering this unipolar order, because their affirmation of world citizenship necessarily 
fails to be fully inclusive. Hence, world citizenship is actually complicit in advancing and 
perpetuating the reign of the American empire. 
Mouffe’s antiserum against the dominance of the American empire is a multipolar 
transformation of international relations. This proposal starts from the assumption that 
both unipolar and cosmopolitan models of global politics increase violent tensions 
between transnational actors. Mouffe’s model is primarily concerned with meeting two 
demands: (1) accounting for the legitimacy of a deeply pluralistic society of nations and 
(2) devising procedures to defuse dangerous clashes between members of such a society. 
A multipolar world order would thus constitute a political space in which both criteria 
were successfully satisfied. Although Mouffe does not fully elaborate on this proposal, 
we can think of her alternative as analogous to the concept of agonistic pluralism at 
home. With regard to the chances of realizing such a multipolar order Mouffe asserts: 
I do not want to minimize the obstacles that need to be overcome, but, at least in 
the case of the creation of a multipolar order, those obstacles are only of an 
empirical nature, while the cosmopolitan project is also based on flawed 
theoretical premises. […] Once it is acknowledged that there is no ‘beyond 
hegemony’, the only conceivable strategy for overcoming world dependence on a 
single power is to find ways to ‘pluralize’ hegemony. And this can be done only 
through the recognition of a multiplicity of regional powers.33 
Spelling out the Implicit: The Restoration of Symmetry 
At this point it would be insightful to draw attention to the empirical and historical 
research on the virtues and vices of multipolarity in international relations. What is at 
stake in this literature is whether the aptitude of multipolarity to institutionally design 
mechanisms for peace-keeping and conflict-resolution noticeably exceeds the capacities 
of competing models such as uni- or bipolarity.34 
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It is worthwhile noting that Mouffe must logically endorse a consequence that 
follows directly from her recommendation; a consequence that she herself does not make 
explicit in her euphoric understanding of multipolarity. Given that the present state of 
global affairs is characterized by a military asymmetry, as evidenced by the unipolar 
hegemony of the US, the goal of multipolarity can only be achieved if this disequilibrium 
is balanced out. Bluntly speaking, a multipolar world order would have to trigger a 
massive rearmament of weaker power centres. And rearmament means first and foremost 
the willingness to develop nuclear weapons capability. 
This process has been called the option of ‘restoring symmetry’ in global politics.35 
By encouraging weaker power centres to arm themselves with nuclear weapons, the 
asymmetrical structure would be adjusted such that the current moment of unipolar 
hegemony is broken up and transformed into a system of multipolarity. Without 
speculating too much about the chances of realizing such an option, it is safe to assume 
that such a restoration is extremely hazardous. As a matter of fact, the bleak outlook of 
massive rearmament around the globe involuntarily renders the imperial assurance of a 
pax Americana attractive. 
This caveat refers to an implicit corollary of Mouffe’s plea for multipolarity. 
However, Mouffe primarily wants to make a theoretical claim when she accuses 
cosmopolitan proposals of logically inconsistence; therefore, I shall stick to her abstract 
argument. One question, then, cannot be fended off: is multipolarity as a model 
convincing in the sense that it reflects the transcendental quality of antagonism without 
increasing the likelihood of violent conflicts in global politics? 
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I believe that Mouffe’s embrace of multipolarity drives her, against her will, to an 
impasse. The quandary that any international equivalent of agonistic pluralism faces has 
two horns: either it relapses into an attenuated version of universalism, or it frankly 
declares that the envisaged power centres are caught in a state of nature where resorting 
to aggression always remains on the table.  
We can find arguments pointing at both horns. Multipolarity might be pushed back 
to an attenuated version of universalism as Mouffe’s theory aims at sublimating and 
taming hostility. If the primary purpose of balancing powers in international relations is 
containing and regulating, not unleashing, violence, then we must be able to circumscribe 
a symbolic ground on which each of these powers can have an equal standing. Equal 
standing will be an upshot of reciprocally accepting the terms of legitimate contestation. 
Such acceptance would then create the realm of a ‘global agon.’ As we have seen, 
agonism is a way of manoeuvring between liberal consensus and violent enmity. It is 
absolutely central for Mouffe’s claim about the advantageous stability of agonistic 
pluralism that it is rooted in a shared, undisputed understanding of the rules determining 
the adversarial contest. Once this consensual dimension at the core of agonistic pluralism 
collapses, the adversarial contest will inevitably degenerate into open hostility. 
Transposing the model of adversarial contest to international relations would 
require an analogous acceptance of norms that are exempted from disagreement. This 
move postulates at least a small number of universal rules of conduct between power 
centres. Whereas Mouffe is not willing to accept a full-fledged version of world 
citizenship, she is still obliged, for reasons internal to her approach, to appeal to a sphere 
that remains isolated from the battlefield of hegemonic struggles. If multipolarity 
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proposes a system to mitigate the worst excesses of a pax Americana – excesses that 
would effectively be amplified within a cosmopolitan regime – then it must be based on 
some form of consensus with regard to which power centres are to be included in the 
global agon and which are to be excluded from it. The very logic of how to transform 
antagonism into agonism forces Mouffe to make this distinction between proper and 
illicit contenders for participation in the global agon. 
This brings us back to Mouffe’s critique of deliberative accommodations of 
difference. As a general point one has to remark that it is inscribed in the grammar of the 
word ‘pluralism’ that it constantly incites a parallel discourse about the limits of 
pluralism. Mouffe herself is pulled into this discourse. The call for a pluralization of 
global politics has a constant echo: Where should the threshold of legitimacy be set that 
contenders for the status of a power centre have to surpass? How should we construe 
mechanisms of access to, and exit from, the global agon? 
For Mouffe it is the drawing of a demarcation line, separating the inner space of the 
agon from its constitutive outside, which enables the republican formation of the 
‘people.’36 The importance of preserving political unity becomes evident in Mouffe’s 
rejection of legal pluralism. She is highly sceptical of the suggestion that different 
versions of the rule of law can coexist within multicultural societies, since this way of 
practicing diversity would disrupt the uniform space of the agon. In her criticism of legal 
pluralism Mouffe stresses the significance of keeping the people united: 
A democratic society requires the allegiance of its citizens to a set of shared 
ethico-political principles, usually spelled out in a constitution and embodied in a 
legal framework, and it cannot allow the coexistence of conflicting principles of 
legitimacy in its midst.37 
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Human Rights and the Limits of the Global Agon 
These thoughts allow a key insight into Mouffe’s concept of multipolarity. Let us 
consider what an equivalent to ‘a set of shared ethico-political principles’ on a 
transnational level would look like. For it is only with the help of these principles that we 
can define criteria of access to, and exit from, the global agon between power centres of 
equal standing. A natural candidate for such a set of values would be human rights. 
Human rights might be conceptualized as providing the foundation on which peaceful 
disagreement between power centres could be exercised. The respect for these rights 
might then figure as a limitation clause to appropriate acts of sovereign self-expression. 
This view roughly mirrors Rawls’ conception of ‘decency’ in international relations.38 
How does Mouffe conceive of human rights? It is in her treatment of human rights 
that we can see why Mouffe cannot stay the course of consistently refuting universals. 
Although she intends to preserve human rights in a multipolar world order, she argues 
against a unified conception of human rights: 
I insist on the necessiaty [sic] of pluralizing the notion of human rights, so as to 
prevent them from becoming an instrument in the imposition of Western 
hegemony. To acknowledge a plurality of formulations of the idea of human rights 
is to bring to the fore their political character. The debate about human rights 
cannot be envisaged as taking place in a neutral terrain where the imperatives of 
morality and rationality – as defined by the West – would represent the only 
legitimate criteria. It is a terrain shaped by power relations where a hegemonic 
struggle takes place, hence the importance of making room for a plurality of 
legitimate understandings.39 
It is, of course, important to acknowledge that political interests play a role in 
specific formulations of human rights. Legal documents are products of a certain time 
and place. But what does it mean to tolerate a ‘plurality of legitimate understandings’ of 
human rights? Apparently Mouffe embraces something similar to legal pluralism when it 
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comes to regulating international relations. The point I want to emphasize is not that 
Mouffe commits a mistake in elevating agonistic pluralism to the level of global politics. 
I would rather raise a more fundamental point about the nature of agonistic pluralism 
itself: its limits must necessarily be stable, or close to stability, to ensure the peaceful 
settlement of conflicts between adversaries. 
Pluralizing human rights, however, is the wrong strategy for circumscribing the 
space of a global agon. Opening up the debate about human rights sounds like an 
attractive idea, but it also deprives the multipolar world order of a chief barrier against 
the uncontrolled proliferation of antagonisms. The matter of the fact is that a unified 
conception of human rights, exempted from hegemonic struggles over their meaning, 
could effectively serve as a yardstick for holding various power centres accountable. The 
respect for human rights would then fasten the threshold above which violent enmity 
turns into adversarial contest. This is not to say that human rights are discovered on a 
‘neutral terrain,’ quite on the contrary. Human rights are obviously the objects of fierce 
controversies, and it would be absurd to assume that debates about their form and content 
will ever be non-political. But once we have reached a temporary and contingent 
conclusion about what should count as a human right, we have precisely such a neutral 
terrain at our disposal on which further disagreement can take place peacefully. From the 
very viewpoint of agonistic pluralism, human rights actually should become an 
indisputable measure to distinguish between proper and illicit acts of sovereign self-
expression.40 
The tension between the rejection of world citizenship, motivated by Mouffe’s 
critique of universalism, and the promise of peace in global affairs, encapsulated in her 
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affirmative account of a multipolar restructuring of great power relations, pulls Mouffe’s 
theory in opposite directions. If cosmopolitanism is flawed in suppressing and displacing 
the antagonistic dimension of the political, Mouffe’s conception of a multipolar order is 
underdetermined: unless aggression and violence are acknowledged as acts of sovereign 
self-expression, a minimal consensus needs to constrain the relations between the various 
poles. Here, Mouffe’s proposal is restricted by her concern for taming and sublimating 
antagonism. 
This dilemma shows why, within the framework of agonistic pluralism, a firm 
dichotomy between politics and morality is hard to sustain. The transformation of 
antagonism into agonism is in itself motivated by a moral judgment. While the 
metamorphosis demanded of a democratic polity maintains the priority of politics over 
morality, it is still conditioned by a decision about the impermissibility of aggression and 
violence. This decision reflects a moral judgment on the vicissitudes of unrestrained and 
proliferated antagonism. Favouring the adversary over the enemy follows from a 
normative assessment; it is more than a political act of prudence. This observation is true 
even if Mouffe’s adversarial contest retains distinctive features that set it apart from 
liberal accommodations of difference. What I want to stress is that one can, and indeed 
should, be critical of processes of moralization. At the same time, one can, and indeed 
should, endorse a consensus that limits the range of sovereign self-expression in the 
society of nations. 
The Terrorist: Enemy or Adversary? 
An example will help to see more clearly the dilemma in which Mouffe’s critique of 
cosmopolitanism ends up. Let us turn to Mouffe’s own explanation of terrorism and 
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counterterrorism. We might think of ‘the terrorist’ – if it makes sense at all to think about 
him in such an abstract, detached manner – as someone who does not really play by the 
rules. This is the case of someone who deliberately refuses the agon and consciously 
intensifies the antagonistic dimension of the political. Mouffe maintains that her proposal 
of multipolarity would be better suited to cope with this problem, because terrorism is 
described as resulting from a unipolar world in which, due to the absence of real 
alternatives to the American empire, discontent with the status quo must be voiced 
violently. 
The question we need to ask is what a democratic polity dedicated to agonistic 
pluralism should do with the terrorist who subverts the realm of legitimate contestation 
by simply purporting to acknowledge the symbolic ground of the agon, without true 
allegiance to its communal values. The embodiment of this menace would be the 
‘sleeper’ who acts as if socially assimilated until called to duty. Faced with this 
challenge, Mouffe’s polity has two options: the first one would be to take the terrorist’s 
intentions and deeds at face value and treat him how he treats ‘us.’ (Again, if it makes 
sense at all to think about us in such an abstract, detached manner.) This would imply that 
we have to confront the terrorist as an enemy, not as an adversary. The sublimating and 
taming effects of agonism have not had any impact on the terrorist, therefore we simply 
cannot afford to pretend that he may still become part of a non-violent relation between 
equals. This thread of argumentation is visible in many vindications of the current ‘war 
on terror.’ The point is often made that the standard elements of the law of warfare (ius in 
bello) and of domestic criminal law, such as the unconditional ban on torture and habeas 
corpus, simply do not pertain to the new context of deterritorialized terrorism.41 
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This is, without any doubt, not the route that Mouffe wants to pursue. But the 
opposite direction, her second option, is blocked by the general suspicion against 
universal norms. It is not clear how and why the members of a democratic polity could be 
encouraged, let alone be obliged, to grant the terrorist the protected status of an 
adversary, if not by the self-commitment to universal norms that apply to members and 
non-members alike. The exposure of human rights to hegemonic struggles, however, 
undermines the potency of universal norms exceeding the borders of particular 
communities. If Mouffe wants the terrorist to benefit from the taming and sublimating 
effects of agonism, she needs to conceive of a narrow, yet distinguishable ‘set of shared 
ethico-political principles’ regulating international relations. The logic of her argument 
makes this conclusion unavoidable. 
IV. Conclusion 
One can, of course, always be more or less charitable in reading an author, and it might 
be objected to my interpretation of Mouffe’s theory that it disrespects the principle of 
charity. Thus, I have to clarify what conclusions should be drawn from my reading of 
Mouffe. The tension in her account can plausibly be interpreted as an intentional strategy 
of polemic. Following this line of reasoning, one might argue that her critique should 
rather be understood as a ‘metaphorical redescription’42 than as a straightforward 
rejection of cosmopolitanism. The proposal for multipolarity then has to be interpreted as 
an intervention into the debate that aims at highlighting blatant gaps in the literature on 
world citizenship. 
It is certainly sensible to remain alert to processes of moralization and 
depoliticization. Formal appeals to universalism, which are prevalent in some accounts of 
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cosmopolitanism, can undoubtedly become vehicles for imperialism. Identifying one’s 
own position as universal is a common practice of domination. Pierre Bourdieu called 
this practice ‘egoistic universalism’43; keeping an attentive watch over the potential 
interweaving of the seemingly all-embracing ethics of cosmopolitanism with the specific 
interests of cultural, economic and political elites is of capital importance. 
Yet, to contrast such processes of moralization and depoliticization with an account 
of pure politics, insulated from the tainting touch of universal norms, is disingenuous 
unless we approve of the anarchic juxtaposition of power centres. Mouffe’s ideal of pure 
politics might be a reaction to the dominance of moralizing and depoliticizing versions of 
cosmopolitanism. In that sense, her firm dichotomy between politics and morality is more 
rhetorical than argumentative; it is the product of overdrawn generalizations and artificial 
oppositions endemic in academic debates. As I hope to have shown, Mouffe’s realist 
examination of moralizing and de-politicizing forms of world citizenship and her 
proposal for a multipolar globe have to rely on a moral judgment. Without diminishing 
the merits of her powerful assessment, I believe that recognizing the unavoidability of 
this minimal morality could put the debate between critics and defenders of 
cosmopolitanism on a sounder basis. The most important issue in this debate will 
arguably be to inquire into the concrete form and content of the minimal morality. 
Although this paper has not adopted a constructive stance in this debate, it has established 
that even a realist position supportive of a multipolar adjustment of global politics needs 
to grapple with the issue. 
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